Jerry on PieFed

Just a techie guy running feddit.online to allow people to communicate, make friends and acquaintances. Odd coming from a happy introvert, right? (https://jerry.hear-me.blog/about)

I also own these publicly available applications:
Mastodon: https://hear-me.social/
Alternative Mastodon UI: https://phanpy.hear-me.social/
Peertube: https://my-sunshine.video/
Friendica: https://my-place.social/
Matrix: https://element.secure-channel.net/
XMPP/Jabber: https://between-us.online/
Bluesky PDS: https://blue-ocean.social/ (jerry.blue-ocean.social) Mobilizon (Facebook Events Alt): https://my-group.events/
and more…

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Joined 1 year ago
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Cake day: September 29th, 2024

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  • It’s worse than you think. An IMSI catcher is not even needed to find out what phones are in an area:

    Section 3.4.1: Presence Testing in LTE
    https://www.eff.org/wp/gotta-catch-em-all-understanding-how-imsi-catchers-exploit-cell-networks

    Passive Presence Testing

    The simplest way to do presence testing in LTE doesn’t actually require someone to have what we usually consider a CSS (e.g. a device that pretends to be a legitimate cell tower). Instead, all that’s required is simple radio equipment to scan the LTE frequencies, e.g. an antenna, an SDR (Software Defined Radio), and a laptop. Passive presence testing gets its name because the attacker doesn’t actually need to do anything other than scan for readily available signals (Shaik et al, 2017).

    RRC paging messages are usually addressed to a TMSI, but sometimes IMSI and IMEI are also used. By monitoring these unencrypted paging channels, anyone can record the IMSIs and TMSIs the network believes is in a given area . In the next section, we’ll see how an attacker can correlate a TMSI to a specific target phone, as right now collecting TMSIs simply means recording pseudonyms.

    There are descriptions in the article of other ways to find phones without using an IMSI Catcher or fake tower.